In short
Every conversation on Linxy is protected, but not all of them are protected from the same people. Between two people, messages are encrypted on the devices themselves, so the platform holds them in a form it cannot read. With an organization, the organization's authorized staff can read the channel — that is what a support channel is for — and the stored copy is encrypted with keys the platform manages on the organization's behalf.
The useful question is therefore never “is this encrypted”. It is who is able to read it, and the answer is decided by who is on the other end rather than by a setting either of you can change.
On this page
The question that actually matters
“Encrypted” is close to meaningless on its own. Nearly everything on the internet is encrypted while it travels; a great deal of it is also encrypted where it is stored. Neither fact tells you whether a human being other than your correspondent can open it, and that is the only thing most people are really asking.
So the honest way to describe this is by naming the readers. There are three possible ones, and every conversation has a defined answer:
Person-to-person conversations
These are encrypted end to end. Your device and the other person's device each hold their own key material, agree a key for the conversation between themselves, and encrypt every message before it leaves the phone. The platform carries and stores the result without being able to open it.
This is on by default for new person-to-person conversations, and it needs no setup, no passphrase and no ceremony. It does require both sides to be on a current Linxy App: encryption depends on both devices having published the key material it works from. If one side is on an old version that has not, the conversation falls back to being protected in transit and where it is stored, rather than end to end — and the App says so, rather than leaving you to guess.
Images and file attachments are treated the same way as text. They are encrypted on your device before upload, and what sits in storage is an opaque blob.
Voice and video calls between two people are also end-to-end encrypted. If a device cannot establish the call key, the call is declined rather than being quietly downgraded to something weaker.
Organization conversations
A channel with an organization is readable by that organization. Its staff open it in a console, several people may answer over time, a conversation can be handed to a colleague, and the record persists so that the next person who picks it up knows what has already been said. All of that is the service you are being given.
What that means concretely: do not send anything into a brand channel that you would not be willing to have a company hold in its records. Not because it is careless with it — the stored copy is encrypted, access is controlled, and the platform manages the keys on the organization's behalf — but because the entire purpose of the channel is that the organization can read and act on it.
Some organizations operate under rules that forbid even that arrangement — clinical, legal and law-enforcement work, typically. Those need a channel that no platform-held key can open, which is a separate, stricter arrangement negotiated with Linxy rather than a switch inside an ordinary brand's console. If your work requires it, ask before you rely on it.
Event group rooms
A group room at an event is a room. Everyone in it can read what is posted, which is what makes it useful for a session, a table or a track. Stored copies are encrypted, but the readership is “everyone admitted to the room”, and people are admitted and removed over the life of an event.
Treat a room as semi-public. For anything you would only say to one person, use the one-to-one Connection with that person instead — which, at an event, is exactly what an attendee-to-attendee Connection is.
Who can read what
| Conversation | Readable by | Encrypted end to end | Stored copy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Person to person | The two people | Yes, by default, when both are on a current App | Ciphertext with no platform key. Text, images and files |
| Person to person, one side on an old App | The two people | No — protected in transit and at rest instead | Encrypted at rest |
| Organization to person | You, and the organization's authorized staff | No, by design | Encrypted at rest with platform-managed keys |
| Event group room | Everyone admitted to the room | No | Encrypted at rest |
| One-to-one voice or video call | The two participants | Yes — the call is declined rather than downgraded | Not recorded |
How to tell, inside the App
- Attach something. When you stage an image or a file, the App states plainly whether the items will be encrypted on your device before sending, or whether this conversation is not encrypted. It is the most direct answer available and it takes one tap to see.
- Look at who is on the other end. An organization with a logo means a channel its staff can read. A display name means a two-party conversation.
- On a call, the encryption state is shown on the call screen itself.
- If a message reads “Encrypted message” where text should be, this device cannot decrypt that one — see the table below.
What this does not protect against
Stating the limits is the only way the guarantees above are worth anything.
| Not protected against | Why |
|---|---|
| The person you are talking to | They can read, screenshot, quote, forward and keep anything you send. Encryption has never addressed this and cannot |
| Somebody holding your unlocked phone | The keys live on the device and the biometric gate is what stands in front of them. Device security is your part of this |
| Anything you send into a brand channel | Readable by that organization's staff, on purpose |
| Anything posted in a group room | Readable by everyone admitted, now and later |
| Regulated or high-threat use | The person-to-person encryption is built to keep the platform out of ordinary private conversations. It is not a regulated-grade tool and should not be relied on as one |
| The fact that a conversation exists | The platform can see that two parties have a channel and when it was used, even when it cannot read a word of it |
Symptoms, causes and fixes
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| A message shows as “Encrypted message” | This device cannot decrypt that message — usually a reinstall, a new device, or a message from before this device's key existed | Newer messages will read normally. Historical messages encrypted to a key this device never held cannot be recovered by support |
| The App says a peer conversation is not encrypted | One side is on an App version that has not published key material | Both sides update the Linxy App. Nothing is lost in the meantime; the conversation still works |
| A call ends immediately with no obvious error | The call key could not be established, so the call was declined rather than downgraded | Retry on a stable connection. This is a deliberate fail-closed behavior |
| An image will not load some time after opening a thread | Encrypted media is fetched with a short-lived authorization | Reopen the conversation so the App fetches it again |
| You want message history moved to a new phone | End-to-end material is held by the device, not by the platform | Set up recovery in advance. Do not assume history is server-side and restorable |
| You want a brand channel nobody at the brand can read | Not possible — it would remove the reason the channel exists | Use a person-to-person Connection with an individual, or ask about a regulated arrangement |
Things people commonly get wrong
Related reading: Types of Connection, Consent, and what each side can see, Ending a Connection, and Recovering your account after losing your device.